67.       Imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when offence punishable with fine only.- If the offence be punishable  with fine only, 1[ the imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of the fine shall be simple, and] the term for which the  Court directs the offender to be imprisoned,  in default of payment of fine, shall not exceed the following scale, that is to say, for any term not exceeding two months when the amount of the shall not  exceed fifty rupees, and for any term not exceeding four months when the amount shall not exceed one hundred rupees, and for  any term not exceeding four months when the amount shall not exceed one hundred rupees, and for any term not exceeding six month in any other  case.

 

68.       Imprisonment to terminate on payment of fine.- The imprisonment which is imposed in default of payment of a fine  shall terminate whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law.

 

69.       Termination of imprisonment on payment of proportional  part of fine- If before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed in default of payment, such a proportion of the fine be paid or levied that the term of imprisonment suffered in default of a payment is not less than proportional  to  the part of the fine still unpaid, the  imprisonment shall terminate.

 

Illustration

A is sentenced to a fine of one hundred rupees and to four months’ imprisonment in default of payment. Here if seventy-five rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the expiration of one month of the imprisonment. A will be discharged  as soon as the  first month has expired. If seventhly- five rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of  the first month , or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment. A will be immediately discharged. If fifty rupees  be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of those two months, or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment, A will be immediately discharged.

 

  1. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882., sec. 3.

 

70.       Fine leviable within six years or during imprisonment Death not to discharge property from liability .- The  fine, or any part there of which remains unpaid, may be levied at ant time within six year after the passing of the sentence, and if ,under the sentence, the  offender be liable to imprisonment for a longer period than six years, then at any time  previous to the expiration of that period; and the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts.

 

71.       Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences.- Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of  which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided.

 

2[ Where any things is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offence are defined or  punished, or  where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.]

                                    Illustrations

(a)        A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to  Z by the whole beating. And also by each of the  blows which make up the whole beating . If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for the whole beating.

(b)        But if, while A is beating Z,Y interferes, and A intentionally strikes Y, here as  the blow given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to  Z, A is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another  for the blow given to Y.

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  1. Added by Act 8 of 1882, sec.4.

 

72.       Punishment of person guilty of one of several offences, the judgment stating that it is doubtful of which.- In all cases  in which judgment is given that a person is  guilty  of one of several offences specified in the judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences, he is guilty, the  offender shall be punished for the offence for  which the lowest punishment is provided if the same punishment is provided if the same punishment  is not provided for all.

 

73.       Solitary confinement.- Whenever  any person is convicted of an offence for which under this Code the Court has power to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment,  the Court may, by its sentence, order that the offender shall be  dept in  solitary confinement of any portion or portions of the imprisonment to  which he is sentenced, not exceeding  three months in the while, according  to the following scale, that is to say-

a time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall not exceed six months;

a time not exceeding  two months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed six

month s and 1[shall not  exceed one]  year.

 A time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed one year.

 

74.       Limit of solitary confinement.-  In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement shall in no case exceed fourteen days at a tune, with intervals  between the periods of solitary confinement of nit less duration then such confinement  shall not exceed seven days in any one month of the  while imprisonment awarded, with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration than such periods.

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1.        Subs . by Act 8 of 1882, sec. 5 for  “be less than a.

 

 

2[75.     Enhanced punishment for certain offences under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII after previous conviction.- Whoever, having  been convicted,-

(a)        by a court in 3[India], of an offence punishable under  Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of this Code with imprisonment  of  either description for a term of three years or upwards, 1[***] shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like imprisonment  for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to 2[imprisonment for life], or to imprisonment of either description of for a term which may extend to ten years.]

 

 

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS

 

76.       Act done by a person bound , or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law.- Nothing  is an offence which is dine by a person who is , or  who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.

Illustrations

(a)        A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of the  order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.

(b )       A , an officer of  a Court of justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and , after due enquiry, believes  to be, given to him by law .

77.       Act of judge when acting judicially.- Nothing is an offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.

 

Illustrations

2. Subs. by Act 3 of  1910,sec. 2, for the original section.

3.The words “British India” have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, sec.3 and Sch., to  read as above.

 

78.       Act done by a pursuant to  the judgment  or order of Court.- Nothing which is dine in pursuance of , or  which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court  of justice; if dine whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.

 

79.       Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing  himself justified, by law.-  Nothing is an offence which is dine by any person who  is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith , believes himself to be justified by law in good faith, be lives himself to be justified by law, in doing it.

Illustration

            A see Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A ,in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of  the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the  fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self defense

 

80.       Accident in doing a lawful act.- Nothing is an offence which is done by accident  or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution. A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a men who is standing by. Here, if there was no want of proper conation on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence.

 

81.       Act likely to cause harm, but dine without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm.- Nothing  is an offence merely by reason of its being dine with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be dine without any criminal intentions to cause harm, and in good faith for  purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.

Explanation.- It is question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the  act with the knowledge that it  was likely to cause harm.

Illustrations

(a)        A, the  captain  of a steam vessel, suddenly  and without  any fault or negligence on his  part, finds himself in such a position   that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably  run down to boat B, with twenty or thirty passenger on board, unless he changes  the course of his vessel, and that, by  changing his course, he must incur risk of running sown a boat C with only two passengers  on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if  A alters his course without any intention to run down  the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of  an offence, though he may run down the boat  C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it  e found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.

(b)        A, in  a great fire, pulls down houses on order to prevent the conflagration from spreading . He dies this with  the intention in good Faith of saving human life or property. Here, if it is found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act A is not guilty of the offence.

 

82.       Act of  a child under seven years of age.- Nothing  is an offence which is dine by a child under seven years of age.

 

83.       Act of  child  above seven and under twelve of  immature understanding.-Nothing is an offence which is dine by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the  nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

 

84.       Act of a person of unsound mind.- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the act, or  that he is doing what  is either wrong or contrary to law.

 

85.       Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time  of doing it , is  by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of  the act, or that  he is doing what is either wrongs, or contrary  to law; provided that the  thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

(i)         Voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for commission of a crime ; Mirza Ghani Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh,(1997) 2 Crimes 19 (AP).

(ii)        So far as knowledge is concerned, the  standard of test is same as in case of intention;

(iii)       The court must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober unless he was besides his mind altogether at the time of incident; Mirza Ghani Baig v.State of Andhra Pradesh,(1997)2 Crimes 19 (AP).

86.       Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.- In cases where an act done is not an offence unless dine with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to  be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge  as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

COMMENTS

(i)         The  prosecution  has to prove that in spite of drunkenness the accused had intention  to commit the act forbidden by law; Mirza Gani Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh,(1997)2  Crimes 19 (AP).

(ii)        Sometimes intention on the  part of the  person who is drunk can also be assessed from the nature of weapon used in the commission of the offence. If a person uses a weapon which is not dangerous and the attack results in death, a malicious intention cannot be drawn against him even though drunkenness is no excuse; Mirza  Ghani Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh,(1997)2  Crimes 19 (AP).

87.       Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt , done by consent.- Nothing which is not intended to cause death , or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied , to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to causes to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.

Illustration

            A, a surgeon , knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death and intending in good faith, Z’s benefit performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence.

88.       Act not  intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit.- Nothing  which is not intended to cause death , is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the sore to  be likely to cause, to any  person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk or that harm.

Illustration

            A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death and intending in good faith, Z’s benefit performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no  offence.

89.       Act done in good faith for benefit faith for benefit of child or by consent or guardian.-  Nothing which is done in good faith for the  benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or of unsound mind, by or  by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian  or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person:

Provisos –Provided-

First-That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;

Secondly-That this exception shall not extend to the  doing of any thing which the person doing it knows to  be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous  disease or infirmity;

Thirdly-That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to  cases hurt, unless it be  for the  purpose of  preventing death or grievous hurt, or  the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

Fourthly-That this exception  shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.

Illustrations

A , in good faith, for his child’s  benefit without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone   by a surgeon, knowing it to  be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not intending to cause the child’s  death , but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the exception in as much as his object was the cure of the child.

90.       Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.-  A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if  the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or

Consent of insane person.- if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness  of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his  consent; or

Consent of child.- unless the contrary appears from the  context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.

91.       Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused.- The exceptions in sections 87,88 and 89 do not extend to acts  which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to  the persons giving the consent , or on whose behalf the consent is given.

Illustration

            Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason  of such harm”; and the consent of the women

92.       Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent.- Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person’s consent , if the  circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving  consent, and has  no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it  possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:

Provisos-  Provided-

First-That this exception shall not extend shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;

Secondly- That this exception shall not extend to  the doing of any thing which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

Thirdly-That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any  purpose other than  the preventing of death or hurt;

Fourthly-That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to  the committing of which offence it  which  offence to would not extend.

Illustrations

(a)        Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, find that Z requires to be trepanned. A, not intending Z’s death, but in good faith, for Z’s benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.

(b)        Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z’s benefit. A’s ball gives Z a mortal wound. A  has committed on offence.

(c)        A, a surgeon , see a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child’s guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child’s benefit. A has committed no offence.

(d)        A is a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below  hold out a blanket. A drops the child from the housetop , knowing  it to be likely that the  fall  may kill the child, but  not intending to kill the child, and intending , in good faith, the  child’s benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence.

            Explanation.- Mere pecuniary benefit is not  benefit within the meaning of sections 88, 89 and  92.

93.       Communication made in good faith.- No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person  to whom it is made, if it is made for the  benefit of that  person .

A,  a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. There patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the  patient’s death.

94.       Act to which a person is compelled by threats.- Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with  death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to  do it by  threats, which at the time of doing  it, reasonably cause the  apprehension that instant death to  that person will otherwise be the consequence:  Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

Explanation 1.- A person who , of his own accord, or by reason  of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit  of this exception ,on  the  ground of his having been compelled  by his associates to do anything  that is an offence by law.

Explanation 2.-  A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to  take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception .

95.       Act causing slight harm.- nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or  that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would  complain of such harm.

Of the Right of Private Defense

97.       Things done in private defence.- Nothing is an offence which is dine in the exercise of the right of  private defense.

COMMENTS

(i)          In judging whether accused has exceeded his right to private defense or not the court has to tale into account the weapons used; Madan Mohan  Pandey v. State  of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 467 (SC)

(ii)        The accused is not required to prove the plea of private defense of person beyond reasonable manner of doubt. The onus on the accused is only to show that the defiance version is probable one which is reflected from the salient features and the circumstances in the prosecution case itself; Sawai Ram v. State of  Rajsathan, (1997)2 Crimes 148 (Raj).

(iii)       Divergent views expressed by court where prosecution failed to explain the injuries sustained by accused in same occurrence. Hence referred to larger Bench; Ram Sunder Yadav v. State  of Bihar , 1999 Cr LJ 3671 (SC).

(i)                  The  defense version regarding accused acting in self defense was liable to be proved by accused; Rasikbhai  Ram  Singh Rana v. State  of Gujarat, 1999 (1) Guj CR 176.

97.       Right of private defiance of the body and of property.- Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend-

First-His own body, and  the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;

Secondly- The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself  or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition  of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.

COMMENTS

Where the  accused persons armed with guns started continuous firing  at members of prosecution parties, even if  accused has a claim of right  to the  property should have approach to Magistrate it is  difficult to concede  right of private defence; Ayodhya Ram  v. State, 1999 (4) Crimes 113:

98.       Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.- When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the  want of maturity of understanding, the  unsoundness of mind or the  intoxication  of the  person doing act, or by reason of any misconception on the  part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act where that offence.

Illustrations

(i)         Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A;Z guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence which  he would have if Z were sane.

(ii)        A enters by  night a house which he is legally entitled to enter Z, in good faith, taking A for  a house- breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of  private defence against Z, which he  would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.

99.       Act against which there is no right of private defence.- There is no right of private defence against an act which  does not reasonably  cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if  done , or  attempted to  be dine, by a public servant acting in good faith under co lour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.

There is  right of private defence against an act which dose not, reasonably cause the  apprehension of death or  of grievous hurt, if  done, or attempted to be done, by the  direction of a public servant acting in good faith under co lour of his office, though that direction may  not be strictly justifiable by law.

There is no right of private defence in case in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.

Extent to which the right may be exercised.- The  right of private defence in no  case extends to the inflicting of mire harm than it is necessary to inflict for the  purpose of defence.

Explanation 1.- A person is not deprived  of the right of private defence against an  act done , or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to  believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.

Explanation 2.- A  person is not deprived  of  the right  of the right  of private defense against an act done, or attempted to be done ,by the  direction of an public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority  under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority , if demanded .

100.     When  the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.- The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of  death or of any other harm to the  assailant, if the offence which occasions  the exercise of  the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter  enumerated, namely:-

First.-  Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the  consequence of such assault;

Secondly.- Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous  hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

Thirdly. – An assault with the intention of committing rape;

Fourthly.- An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

Fifthly.-   An assault with the intention of  kidnapping or abducting;

Sixthly.- An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining  a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.

COMMENTS

(i)                                        The  inmates clearly had a right  of private defence against the against the intruders who tried to extract  money by force; Kishore Shambhudata  Maharashtra,(1989) Cr LJ 1149: AIR 1989 SC 1173.

(ii)                                       If the  accused had already dealt several blows on the deceased, he could not have been in a position to shoot at the accused persons. Having regard to some of the admissions made by the witness, it appears that the accused took forcible possession of the  land some days ago. Therefore, even assuming that they come into possession after committing trespassing, if the deceased and others had gone to the land they cannot  be held to be aggressors as pleaded by  the defence; Khuddu v. State of  Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1993 SC 1538 (1540).

(iii)                                     Under what circumstances accused gave knife blow to the deceased could be not explained  by accused, acquittal on ground of self defence not justified; State of Uttar Pradesh v.Laeeg, 1999 (5)SCC 588 :AIR 1999 SC 1942.

(iv)                                     While being chased by deceased appellant attacked on deceased caused fire incited wound, held  exceeded the right of private defence, conviction under section 304 Part I Proper; Suresh Singh v.State, AIR 1999 SC 1773 : 1999 (2) Crimes 42.

(v)                                      Attack by single blow on the neck of  deceased proved fatal.Held accused exceeded right  of private defence; Amar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1997 SCC (Cr) 630.

(vi)                                     Self inflicted injuries not explained by  prosecution except the reliance on medical evidence acquittal of accused not justified ; Chuhar Singh v. State of Punjab,1999   AIR (SC) 1773: 1999 (2) Crime 1052: 1991 SC (Cr) 1066: 1998 (4) JT 449.

(vii)                                   Absence of pleading of self defence  injuries caused by sharp cutting weapon circumstances of blow by knife nit explained by accused on deceased acquittal by High Court set aside ;State of Uttar Pardesh v. Laeeq, 1999 (5) SCC 588: 1999 (5) Supreme 55.

101.   When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.- If the  offence be not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section , the right of private defence of the body   dies not extend to the voluntary causing of death to  the  assailant, but dies extend, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing  to the assailant of any harm other than death.

102. Commencement and continuance of  the right of private defence of the  body.- The right of private defence  of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the  offence though the  offence may not have been committed ; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.

103. When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.- The right  of private defence or property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer ,if  the offence, the  committing of which , or  the attempting to commit which, occasions the  exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the  descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:-

            First-               Robbery;

            Secondly- House-breaking by night;

Thirdly- Mischief by fire committed on any building tent or vessel, which building ,tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling , or as a place for the custody of property;

Fourthly-Theft, mischief, or house-trespass,  under such  circumstances as  may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.

STATE AMENDMENTS

State of Karnataka:

(1)        In clause Thirdly,-

(i)         after the words “mischief by fire” ; the  words” or any explosive substance” shall be  inserted;

(ii)        after the words “as  a human dwelling or” insert  the words” as  a place  of worship, or”.

(2)         After clause Fourthly, the following clause shall be inserted, namely:-

            Fifthly .- Mischief by fire or any explosive substance  committed on any property used or intender to be used for the purpose of Government or any local authority, statutory  body or company owned or  controlled by Government , railway or tramway, or on any vehicle used or adapted to be used , for the carriage of  passengers for hire or reward”.

            [Vide Maharashtra Act No. 19 or 1917, sec.26 ,(w.e.f.31-12-1917)].

State  of Maharashtra.

            In section 103, after clause fourthly , add the following clause, namely:-

            “Firstly:- Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on-any property used or intended to be intended to be used for the purpose of Government, or any local authority statutory body or company owned or controlled by Government or railway or any vehicle used or  adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward”.

State of  Uttar Pradesh :

In section 103, after clause fourthly, add the following clause, namely:-

“Fifthly: Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on-

(a)        Any  property used or intended to be used for the purpose of Government, or any local authority or other corporation owned or controlled by the Government, or

(b)        any railway  as  defined in clause (4) of  section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 or railways stores as defined in the Railways Stores (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1955, or

(c)         any transport vehicle as defined in clause (33) of section 2 of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act.

[Vide U.P. Act No. 29 of 1970, sec.2 (w.e.f. 17-7-1970)].

COMMENTS

Ingredient of plea of self  defence not available  - acquittal not justified; Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083 : 1999 (3) SCC 102.

 

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